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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
LLOYD OLSEN, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ALDUS D. CHAPPELL, 
Defendant. 
Case No. 11439 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE 
This is an action by the Plaintiff on a promissory note 
to recover principal and interest. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The Case was tried to a jury. The jury returned 
special interrogatories in favor of the Defendant and 
against the Plaintiff. The Trial Court gave judgment 
for the Plaintiff notwithstanding the interrogatories. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant seeks reversal of the judgment for the 
Plaintiff and judgment in Defendants favor as a matter 
of law or a new trial in the alternative. 
-1-
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On the 20th day of January, 1964 the Defendant and 
one Clark J. Obray "as partners" executed a promissory 
note to John P. Olsen in the amount of $5,173.92 in ex-
change for certain restaurant equipment. Pl. Ex. No. 1. 
A chattel Mortgage was given to secure the prom-
issory note. Pl. Ex. No. 3. Defendant upon execution of 
the note handed it to Mr. Clark J. Obray, who then de-
livered it to John P. Olsen (hereinafter called Mr. Olsen.) 
Tr. 11, Deposition of Mr. Olsen p. 5. 
During the negotiations Mr. Olsen heard a discussion 
between Defendant and Obray that Defendant wanted 
a formal partnership or corporation formed before enter-
ing the business. Tr. 48. No formal partnership was 
entered into nor was a corporation formed. Tr. 48. 
Soon after the execution of the note, the Defendant 
notified Mr. Olsen that he did not desire to go forth with 
the purchase of the equipment for which the note was 
given. Tr. 53 line 3-9. Similar notice was given by Mr. 
Obray Tr. 70. Defendant then without any further being 
done, withdrew. Thereafter Mr. Olsen forwarded all 
papers pertinent to the business and sale to Mr. Obray; 
Franchise was sent to Mr. Obray Tr. 22, all correspondence 
sent to Obrav, Tr. 23, 41. , 
The equipment inventoried in the chattel mortgage, 
Ex. No. 3, was placed in a "Dog 'n Suds" Drive In Resta- 1 
urant in Layton, Utah by Mr. Obray. Mr. Obray sold 
the Layton restaurant in May of 1964 to a Mr. Groves 
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who made payment on the contract to Mr. Olsen of 
$650.00. Tr. 14. Mr. Olsen protested the lack of pay-
ment on the note to Mr. Obray but not to Defendant. 
Ex. 7. Mr. Obray took all of the profit from the sale of 
the Layton Restaurant and invested it in a Salt Lake City 
restaurant. Mr. Olsen at this time was working for Dog 
'n Suds and handled the promotion of the Salt Lake City 
restaurant, and dealt exclusively with Mr. Obray. Mr. 
Olsen and Mr. Obray established a course of conduct as 
follows: 
A. Mr. Obray paid a $25.00 "transfer fee' to transfer 
the franchise into his name, Tr. 36. 
B. Lease for Layton restaurant in Obrays name 
cnly. Tr. 55. 
C. Utility bills in name of Obray only. Tr. 5.5. 
D. Defendant was not a party in contract with 
Dog 'n Suds, Tr. 57, 72. 
E. Defendant was not a party in sale to Mr. Groves. 
Tr. 58, 72. 
F. Defendant received no demand from Mr. Olsen 
upon sale to or default by Groves. Tr. 58. 
G. Mr. Olsen sent no letters or copies of letters to 
Defendant. Tr. 58, 74 Ex. 5, 6, 8, and 9. 
H. Defendant signed no papers in evidence as a 
partner, except the note and mortgage. 
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The Defendant and John P. Olsen, after the telephone 
conversation in March (Tr. 53-54) had a conversation 
on the street in Logan, Utah, in July of the same year, in 
which Mr. Olsen stated that Mr. Chappell had made a 
mistake by getting out of the partnership, and that the 
remaining partner had made a profit from the business. 
Tr. 53-.54. A similar conversation was had by Mr. Obray 
in Salt Lake City with Mr. Olsen, Tr. 71. 
The note and mortgage executed by the Defendant 
was delivered to John P. Olsen, who claims to have de-
livered it to Systems Finance. The record shows no 
assignment. However, Systems Finance assigned the note 
1o the Plaintiff for suit. Mr. John P. Olsen (Tr. 34) claims 
ownership of the note, then on Tr. 34, disclaims owner-
ship of the note. Mr. Olsen acknowledges that he re-
ceived payment on the note from Mr. Groves. (Tr. 14.) 
and the same were not credited to the note (Tr. '19) and 
that he failed to give any credit for the payments upon 
filing the original complaint. Tr. 19. The promissory 
note does not provide for the payment of interest, as such 
provision had been struck from the contract, yet, Mr. 
Olsen provided in said note for principal payments in 
excess of the principal balance, claiming it as "bank rate 
interest" (Tr. 44) and then admits that the amount act-
ually due is the face amount less the payment, with no 
additional amount as interest, Tr. 44. Mr. John P. Olsen 
immediately upon recross examination stated that he 
would have kept the "bank rate interest" had the same 
been paid to him. Tr. 44-4.5. 
Systems Finance sent to the Defendant a notice of 
delinquent payments which was sent by the Defendant 
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to Mr. Obray and the finance company was notified that 
the Defendant was not part of the transaction. Tr. 55, 
56, thereafter no further communications were sent to 
him and no further demands made upon him. Tr. 56. 
Upon the commencement of the suit, the Defendant 
called Mr. John P. Olsen in Illinois and asked him why 
the action was commenced. Mr. Olsen said that he had 
no intention of hurting the Defendant; "that he knew 
that the Defendant was not a party in the transaction and 
that Mr. Olsen was in hopes that the suit against the 
Defendant would bring pressure to bear on Mr. Obray 
thereby coercing Mr. Obray to pay the account." Tr. 56, 
.57. 
The Defendant, upon cross-examination, Tr. 62, 63, 
stated that he claimed he had been released from the 
partnership by Mr. Obray (Tr. 62) and that he had not 
received a release from Plaintiff as "I never felt that we 
were in an association with Mr. Olsen." Tr. 63. Mr. 
Chappell candidly admits that the matter was handled 
poorly. Tr. 63. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AWARD-
ING JUDGMENT TO THE PLAINTIFF NOTWITH-
STANDING THE JURY INTERROGATORIES AND 
PURSUANT THERETO MAKING FINDING NO. 4. OF 
THE FINDINGS OF FACT. AND CONCLUSION NO. 
1 OF THE CONCLUSIONS OF LAW. 
This matter was tried before a jury, who were sub-
mitted special interrogatories. The Trial Court found 
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contrary to the jury findings. In view of the jury's find-
ings the evidence in this case should be viewed most 
favorable to the Defendant. Johnson v. Cornwall Ware-
house Company, 389 P. 2d 710, 15 Ut. 2d 172; also Sey-
bold vs. Union Pac. R. Co. 2.'39 P. 2d 174; 121 Ut. 61. 
5 C.J.S. 1247. 
Viewing the evidence most favorable toward the 
Defendant and viewing disputed evidence for the De-
fendant it would appear that Mr. Olsen, Mr. Obray and 
the Defendant had negotiated for some time as to the 
purchase of the restaurant equipment. That Mr. Olsen 
knew by reason of the conversation stated on Tr. 47, 38, 
that a business organiz::ltion was contemplated between 
Obray and the Defendant. That after the execution of 
the note, the Defendant talked to !\fr. Olsen and informed 
him that he was not joining in the venture with Mr. 
Obray. Mr. Olsen inquired as to Mr. Chappells reasons 
for not staying in the venture and asked as to the where-
abouts of the note, sued upon. Tr. 53. Mr. Olsen denies 
this conversation. 
Mr. Obray then stated that he would continue alone. 
Tr. 69, and informed Mr. Olsen of this fact. Tr. 70. 
Thereafter from the record, it shows, as stated in the state-
ment of Facts, that all business dealings with regards to 
the note, were had between Mr. Olsen and Mr. Obray. 
Systems Finance notified the Defendant by mail of the 
delinquency, and upon return correspondence by the 
Defendant, advising them that he was not a party, no 
further demands were made upon him. The conversation 
on the street between Defendant and !\fr. Olsen indicated 
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his knowledge and consent to the deletion of the Defend-
ants name from the note and mortgage. No party made 
demands upon the Defendant until the action was com-
menced, and at that time the Defendant called Mr. Olsen, 
inquired as to what Mr. Olsen was doing and was told 
that, Mr. Olsen knew he was not a party to the transac-
tion, and that the suit was an effort to apply pressure to 
Mr. Obray to force him to pay the bill even though he 
had taken out bankrnptcy. 
Each of these facts were presented to the jury and 
when asked whether or not Plaintiff (and his prede-
cessors) and Mr. Obray by a course of conduct, made the 
Defendant aware that he was deleted as a party to the 
note and mortgage. 
The jury in detail stated that Mr. Olsen and Mr. 
Obray did infact delete the Defendants name from the 
note and gave the following reasons: 
A. Conversation on the street. 
B. Correspondence written by Mr. Olsen exclusively 
to Mr. Obray. 
C. Failure of Plaintiff to demand payment frorn 
Defendant. 
D. Transfer of Dog 'n Suds to Mr. Obray individ-
ually, specifically omitting the mme of the Defendant. 
E. Fact that Mr. Obray sold the business withoet 
Defendants consent. 
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For these reasons it seems to be clear that the jury 
gave weight to the testimony they believed, and found 
for the Defendant. The jury found that there was a verbal 
agreement to release the Defendant from the note, either 
before or after delivery. The jury also by implication 
found that Mr. Olson was not being candid with the court 
in not revealing in the original Complaint the payments 
made upon the note, and in charging interest through an 
increase in the payments while crossing out the provision 
for the payment of interest in the note. 
The trial judge erred in overruling the findings of 
the jury. 89 C.J.S. 344. 
"A special finding by the jury is binding on, and may 
not be ignored or disregarded by the court, provided 
it is relevant and material to the issues warranted by 
the evidence and does not contain an unwarranted 
conclusion of law, and has not been set aside on 
proper grounds." 
See Nuquist vs. Bauscher, Idaho 227 P. 2d 83. 
"The general rule is that a special finding by the jury 
in a law action is binding on any, not to be ignored 
or disregarded by the court ...... " 
See Todd vs. Borowski, 111, 166 N.W. 2d 296, also 
Whelan vs. Gould, Minn. 106 N.W. 2d 893, and Majerus 
vs. Guelsow, Minn. 113 N .W. 2d 450, where the Supreme 
Court of Minnesota stated: 
"It would seem that the trial judge should have the 
same powers with regard to special verdicts or special 
interrogatories as he has with regard to general ver-
dicts. It is fundamental that a court in its discretion 
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may set aside a general verdict under certain cir-
cumstances. If that is so, why should it not also 
have a right to set aside a special verdict or special 
interrogatories under similar circumstances? When 
he determines that the evidence is conclusive against 
the jury's verdict, he can enter judgment notwith-
standing the verdict in the case of general verdict; 
and in the case of a special verdict or special inter-
rogatories, he can set aside the answers and substitute 
contrary answers therefore . . . (Citing Minnesota 
Rules of Civil Procedure.) As stated in Sorlie v. 
Thomas, 235 Minn .. 509, .51 N.W. 2d 592. A jury's 
verdict on specific fact questions "is binding on the 
court as a general verdict in a law action as is sub-
ject to the same rules as to setting it aside for insuf-
ficiency of evidence." In other words, answers to 
special interrogatories or special verdicts are not 
simply advisory; but at the same time they are no 
more final than a general verdict. If certain answers 
find no support in the evidence, the trial judge may 
set them aside; his action will be upheld on appeal 
unless clearly erroneous . . . . . . . . . The question 
then is whether there is competent evidence tending 
to support the jury's findings. If there is, then the 
trial court committed error in setting them aside." 
The Defendant contends that there is competent 
evidence to support the findings of the jury and therefore 
the Trial Court's decision to set aside the special inter-
rogatories was against the manifest weight of evidence. 
POINT II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RE-
FUSING TO GIVE JUDGMENT FOH THE DEFEND-
ANT AND AGAINST THE PLAINTIFF PURSUANT 
TO THE ANSWEHS TO SPECIAL INTERROGATOR-
IES AS FOUND BY THE JURY. 
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This is an action at law. Therefore the jury was not 
acting in an advisory capacity but the trial judge was 
bound to take the jury's findings subject to the qualifi-
cations set forth in Point I. 
The jury found that by a course of conduct and cer-
tain conversations, that the Plaintiff and his predecessors 
had effecuated a modification of the contract, releaving 
the Defendant from liability although not physically eras-
ing Defendant's name. 
7 A C.J.S. 424 states that: 
"a modification of a contract may be effected by an 
explicit agreement to modify, either in writing or 
parol, but the agreement to modify a contract need 
not be expressed and the fact of agreement may be 
implied from a course of conduct in accordance with 
its existance. 
17A C.J.S. 429 states: 
Modification must be made by the contracting parties 
or someone duly authorized to modify, and one party 
to a contract cannot alter its terms without the 
assent of the other parties; the minds of the parties 
must meet as to the proposed modifications .... So, 
the fact of agreement may be implied from a course 
of conduct in accordance with its existance. Assent 
may be implied from acts on one party in accordance 
with the terms of a change proposed by the other; 
and assent to new terms of performance, even if in-
valid as a contract will serve as an estoppel excusing 
what otherwise would be a default. 
The case of Lee v. Lee, Mich. 165 N.W. 655 is in 
point. Here a son orally contracted with his father to 
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buy his farm. Sixteen years later the son died and his 
wife stayed on the farm, performed the agreements for 
two years. The court held that the father recognized 
the daughter-in-law as a party to the contract by reason of 
her work and acts. The Court held that had the father 
insisted upon his rights at the death of the son the situa-
tion would be different. The court likened this situation 
10 the situation where the original party and the successor 
party entered into a new written agreement. In the case 
,;t bar, Plaintiff had knowledge of the Defendants with-
dr1wal from the partnership, and thereafter accepted Mr. 
Obray as the only responsible party for about two years, 
conducting all correspondence with Mr. Obray, making 
all demands upon Mr. Obray. It was only after Mr. Obray 
became a bankrupt that Mr. Olsen sought remedy against 
the Defendant as a last resort to force Mr. Obray to pay 
the bill by putting Defendant in a position of paying 
Mr. Obray's obligations. 
The case here before the court concerns itself with 
the modification of contracts not the recission or release 
of the parties. The Defendant and Mr. Obray verbally 
agreed to abandon the partnership that had existed. Mr. 
Olsen was notified of this abandonment and through his 
course of conduct indicated that he had modified the 
contract to the extent that Mr. Obray was the sole pur-
chaser of the equipment and therefore received delivery 
of the equipment. 
This writer cannot find a case decided by this Court 
directly in point. It would appear that the case is of 
first impression, and that the decisions of other jurisdic-
tions must be viewed. 
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See: Matanuska Valley Farmers Coop vs Monaghan, 
Alaska 188 F. 2d 906. 
Turner v. Williams, Michigan, 19 N.W. 2d 100. 
Wormsbecker v. Donovan Const. Co., Minn .. 
76 N.W. 2d 643. . 
~titchell v. Rende. Minn., 30 N.W. 2d 27. 
The last case cited and the following case stands for 
the proposition that no new considerations is needed 
where the contract is executory that is modified as the 
consideration for the initial agreement by Mr. Obray is 
sufficient to support the modification. Todd Brothers vs. 
Federal Coop Insurance Corp. 132 N.W. 2d 778. 
CONCLUSION 
In this case the evidence indicates and the Defendant 
admits that he handled the transaction poorly. This fact 
alone does not leave the Defendant without a remedv. 
I 
Mr. Olsen did not, in writing, consent to the modification 
of the agreement from a partnership of Chappell and 
Obray to Obray alone, nor did he agree in writing to the 
sale by Obray to Groves, yet he accepted the payments 
on the contract by Mr. Groves and made demand upon 
Mr. Obray only for an additional lump sum payment. He 
thereby accepted the benefits of the contract and de-
manded additional benefits from Obray alone under the 
contract. Had Mr. Chappell, and the Defendant, at this 
lime been a party to the agreement it would have been 
a prime time for demand upon Defendant for an additional 
payment. Exhibit No. 7. 
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Mr. Chappell had had nothing to do with the pro-
perty since he signed the note. The disposition and sub-
sequent sales of the property have been handled by Mr. 
Obray and by Mr. Olsen representing Dog 'n Suds. Mr. 
Olsen is the person with the knowledge. 
The contract was modified to exclude the partnership 
and insert the name of Mr. Obray, Mr. Obray then as-
signed it to Mr. Groves, and through some procedure the 
property is in the possession of Mr. Wallace Tr. 103-107. 
Mr. Olsen knew of the developments, the payments, made 
the demands, collected the money, and still asserts a mort-
gage upon the property. He has accepted all the benefits 
from Obray and Groves and did not through a period of 
two years, when sales and defaults occurred, contact the 
Defendant. When bankruptcy closed the doors, then and 
only then, did he make his first move toward the De-
fendant in an attempt to use the lawsuit against the 
Defendant to force a bankrupt to pay his obligations, 
knowing that the Defendant was not a party to the con-
tract. 
Respectfully submitted, 
George W. Preston 
Preston, Harris, Harris & Preston 
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant 
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